But cf. Rec. 00-1511, slip op. 2007) (vacating grant of summary judgment to Marshals Service because plaintiff’s allegations that agents were “‘yelling and screaming [their allegations and theories in an effort to intimidate]’ suggests disclosures went beyond what was ‘necessary to obtain information or cooperation’” within terms of published routine use); Brunotte v. Johnson, 892 F. Supp. For example, this CCPA Disclosure does not apply to information that we collect about ind… Indeed, the courts that have rejected the Privacy Act as a discovery privilege have pointed to subsection (b)(11)’s allowance for court-ordered disclosures in support of their holdings. 15, 2006); Snyder v. United States, No. Marginal note:Receipt and investigation of complaints 1. 1978). H-07-2967, 2008 WL 3263550, at *12-13 (S.D. (i)Â the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the individual, but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include. Of course, where an agency is a proper party in a federal case, the district court’s personal jurisdiction over the agency presumably exists and thus court-ordered discovery of the agency’s records is clearly proper under subsection (b)(11). The precise meaning of the term “compatible” is quite uncertain and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  A full list of actions that cannot be undertaken by a nominated person are set out at Optus, Personal—Mobile Account Access at 25 March 2008 and Optus, Small Business—Third Party Access at 25 March 2008. § 16.40(c) (2014); cf. 1979) (finding subsection (b)(2) inapplicable to the “voluntary re-release” of a prior press release (that had been made prior to the effective date of the Privacy Act) as “nothing in the FOIA appears to require such information to be released in the absence of a request therefor”). Note that an agency cannot avoid the result in Doe v. DiGenova by relying on a routine use that seeks to authorize disclosure pursuant to a subpoena. Marginal note:Where disclosure authorized, (2)Â The head of a government institution may disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained from any government, organization or institution described in subsection (1) if the government, organization or institution from which the information was obtained. 1991) (unpublished table decision); Brown v. FBI, No. Research. at 1114. 78-60, slip op. (a)Â pertains to the administration or enforcement of an Act of Parliament; (b)Â is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or. (i)Â the council of a participating First Nation as defined in section 2 of the Anishinabek Nation Education Agreement Act. (d)Â the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual. 06-00292, 2006 WL 3422548, *4-7 (D.D.C. See generally Krohn v. DOJ, No. Oct. 10, 2000); Blazy v. Tenet, 979 F. Supp. 1993). See OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. 81-2480, slip op. 18Â (1)Â The following definitions apply in this section. 84-2392, slip op. 2:06-cv-10561, 2010 WL 2674609, at *7 (E.D. (2)Â For the purposes of any law relating to libel or slander, (a)Â anything said, any information supplied or any document or thing produced in good faith in the course of an investigation carried out by or on behalf of the Privacy Commissioner under this Act is privileged; and. LEXIS 137756, at *3 (E.D.N.C. disclosure is necessary to uphold or enforce the law. at 145. at 3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 1979). 1998) (stating where a disclosure of information regarding individual to Members of Congress in response to inquiries made pursuant to individual’s letters requesting assistance is compatible and thus “would likely be protected under the routine use exception”). Osborne v. USPS, No. Reg. 1997) (determining that SSA’s regulations “generally do not authorize the release of . The White House directed the Office of Management and Budget to issue additional guidance regarding the routine use exception in an executive memorandum on privacy sent to the heads of executive departments and agencies in 1998. 8, 10 (E.D. Data can contain values that identify a specific individual. 942, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing disclosure to plaintiff’s lawyer), aff’d, 792 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. (2)Â Anything that is required to be done by the designated Minister under paragraph (1)(a) or (d) shall be done in respect of the Bank of Canada by the Governor of the Bank of Canada. (2)Â The designated Minister may set forth in the index referred to in subsection (1) a statement of any of the uses and purposes, not included in the statements made pursuant to subparagraph (1)(a)(iv), for which personal information contained in any of the personal information banks referred to in the index is used or disclosed on a regular basis. 30, 31, c. 30, s. 90, c. 34, s. 72 to 74, c. 35, s. 63, c. 38, s. 138, c. 46, s. 58.1, 2006, c. 4, s. 212, c. 9, ss. 189, 248, 255, 256, 2004, c. 2, s. 75, c. 7, s. 35, c. 11, ss. that disclosure constitutes a separate and distinct publication – one not foreclosed by the single publication rule – and [the agency] might be liable for a separate violation of the Privacy Act.” Id. 27(2)(a)(E). . (a)Â the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof; (b)Â an international organization of states or an institution thereof; (c)Â the government of a province or an institution thereof; (d)Â a municipal or regional government established by or pursuant to an Act of the legislature of a province or an institution of such a government; (e)Â the council, as defined in the Westbank First Nation Self-Government Agreement given effect by the Westbank First Nation Self-Government Act; or. See also Perry v. FBI, 759 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. (5)Â Any document or thing produced pursuant to this section by any person or government institution shall be returned by the Privacy Commissioner within ten days after a request is made to the Commissioner by that person or government institution, but nothing in this subsection precludes the Commissioner from again requiring its production in accordance with this section. Id. 1985); Doe v. Naval Air Station, 768 F.2d 1229, 1232-33 (11th Cir. at 614 (“[It] has never been suggested that the Privacy Act was intended to serve as a limiting amendment to . 1996) (finding the disclosure by Military Police of financial records obtained in an ongoing criminal investigation to foreign customs officials likewise involved in an investigation of possible infractions of foreign tax and customs laws was “permitted by the ‘routine use’ exception and d[id] not constitute a violation of the Privacy Act”); Little v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. June 28, 2000), aff’g No. (a)Â for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose; (b)Â for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure; (c)Â for the purpose of complying with a subpoena or warrant issued or order made by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information or for the purpose of complying with rules of court relating to the production of information; (d)Â to the Attorney General of Canada for use in legal proceedings involving the Crown in right of Canada or the Government of Canada; (e)Â to an investigative body specified in the regulations, on the written request of the body, for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation, if the request specifies the purpose and describes the information to be disclosed; (f)Â under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada or any of its institutions and the government of a province, the council of the Westbank First Nation, the council of a participating First Nation as defined in subsection 2(1) of the First Nations Jurisdiction over Education in British Columbia Act, the council of a participating First Nation as defined in section 2 of the Anishinabek Nation Education Agreement Act, the government of a foreign state, an international organization of states or an international organization established by the governments of states, or any institution of any such government or organization, for the purpose of administering or enforcing any law or carrying out a lawful investigation; (g)Â to a member of Parliament for the purpose of assisting the individual to whom the information relates in resolving a problem; (h)Â to officers or employees of the institution for internal audit purposes, or to the office of the Comptroller General or any other person or body specified in the regulations for audit purposes; (i)Â to the Library and Archives of Canada for archival purposes; (j)Â to any person or body for research or statistical purposes if the head of the government institution, (i)Â is satisfied that the purpose for which the information is disclosed cannot reasonably be accomplished unless the information is provided in a form that would identify the individual to whom it relates, and. (3)Â Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply where compliance therewith might, (a)Â result in the collection of inaccurate information; or. Marginal note:Collection of personal information. Sept. 30, 2001) (denying agency summary judgment and ordering discovery to determine whether the agency “overstepped [the] explicit restrictions” contained in its routine use); Vargas v. Reno, No. when ordered to comply with state court subpoenas”); Longtin v. DOJ, No. Mangino v. Army, No. 1976) (analyzing IRS’s disclosure of plaintiff’s identity to other targets of investigation); see also Gowan v. Air Force, 148 F.3d 1182, 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. Even more significantly, the Court held that the identity of the FOIA requester, and any socially useful purpose for which the request was made, are not to be considered in evaluating whether the “public interest” would be served by disclosure. (a)Â cause to be kept under review the manner in which personal information banks are maintained and managed to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Act and the regulations relating to access by individuals to personal information contained therein; (b)Â assign or cause to be assigned a registration number to each personal information bank; (c)Â prescribe such forms as may be required for the operation of this Act and the regulations; (d)Â cause to be prepared and distributed to government institutions directives and guidelines concerning the operation of this Act and the regulations; and. § 552a(b)(4) (Bureau of the Census), “to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a census or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of Title 13.”. . 2d 31, 45-46 (D.D.C. However, because the D.C. 1199, 1215-17 (S.D. 110, 114-15 (D. Minn. 1989); cf. 1999) (finding that requisite showing of good cause had been made by nonparty agency, and providing for entry of protective order with no discussion of jurisdiction over nonparty agency). . 12. Marginal note:Personal information obtained in confidence, 19Â (1)Â Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained in confidence from. 1986). of Cnty. A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States. at 7 (C.D. at 736-37. § 16.41(d) (2014) (Department of Justice regulation regarding verification of identity). But cf. (b)Â for a purpose for which the information may be disclosed to the institution under subsection 8(2). and defendant properly reviewed and released responsive records under the FOIA”). ‘each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of such use.’”), reconsideration granted & vacated in nonpertinent part, (D.D.C. 10173] AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, CREATING FOR THIS PURPOSE A NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Va. Sept. 23, 2011) (finding disclosure of personnel records about plaintiff, a nurse, to state nursing board, HHS, and other healthcare reporting entities fell within routine use); Feldman v. CIA, 797 F. Supp. 1987); Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. 104 F.3d 1396, 1399, 1401-02 (D.C. Cir. 31, 33 (D.D.C. Marginal note:Notice where access requested. at 1-2, 4 (W.D. Mar. (2)Â An application referred to in subsection (1) or an appeal brought in respect of such application shall. Marginal note:Receipt and investigation of complaints, 29Â (1)Â Subject to this Act, the Privacy Commissioner shall receive and investigate complaints. 481, 484-86 (E.D. at 7 (C.D. 75Â (1)Â The administration of this Act shall be reviewed on a permanent basis by such committee of the House of Commons, of the Senate or of both Houses of Parliament as may be designated or established by Parliament for that purpose. (3)Â Where the head of a government institution fails to give access to any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) within the time limits set out in this Act, the head of the institution shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have refused to give access. 5:12-CV-18, 2013 WL 1164499, at *1 n. 2 (E.D.N.C. 2d at 670-73 (D.N.J. , or some other statutory grant of jurisdiction, this court lacks authority to issue a subpoena” against a federal agency for records the plaintiff sought in connection with his divorce proceedings); see also Haydon Bros. R. Civ. 1997) (discussing CIA’s disclosure of information about employee to FBI while FBI was investigating employee’s application for FBI employment), summary affirmance granted, No. history,” does not exclude information that is readily accessible to the public); cf. Id. 2d 873, 876 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (maintaining that although finding disclosure to credit reporting service valid under routine use exception, the information disclosed was already in possession of recipient and that other courts had held that Privacy Act is not violated in such cases), aff’d, 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. Marginal note:Individuals sentenced for an offence, 24Â The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was collected or obtained by the Correctional Service of Canada or the Parole Board of Canada while the individual who made the request was under sentence for an offence against any Act of Parliament, if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to, (a)Â lead to a serious disruption of the individualâs institutional, parole or statutory release program; or. 22,802-03 (May 29, 1985)) permitting disclosure to “federal regulatory agencies with investigative units” is overbroad as it “does not provide adequate notice to individuals as to what information concerning them will be released and the purposes of such release”); cf. 3:00-CV-0535, 2002 WL 32359949, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 1983) (mailing of agency decision affirming employee’s removal to his former attorney held not a “disclosure” as “attorney was familiar with facts of [employee’s] claim” and “no new information was disclosed to him”); cf. 1985) (discussing disclosure of criminal investigative records to judicial committee investigating judge); United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir. In Tripp v. DOD, 193 F. Supp. 1985); see also Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 681-82 (10th Cir. 2d 141, 156-57 (D.D.C. 87-C-9982, 1988 WL 79653, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1988) (discussing disclosure of rap sheet to local police department); Ely v. DOJ, 610 F. Supp. Aug. 3, 2006) (citing Sparks and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that subsection (b)(11) is a “sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity”; concluding that “neither the Superior Court of the District of Columbia nor the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland constitute[s] a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ . Va. Oct. 29, 1999) (magistrate’s recommendation) (rejecting argument that when plaintiffs provided their social security numbers for purpose of determining eligibility for and amount of benefits payable, they consented to use of those numbers as identifiers on multi-captioned hearing notices sent to numerous other individuals and companies as well as to publication of numbers in compilations of opinions), adopted in pertinent part & rev’d in other part, (W.D. 02-0387, 2004 WL 2451409, at *4-5 (D.D.C. . 2009) (“It is enough that the persons to whom disclosure is made are employees of the agency that maintains the records and that those employees have a need for access; disclosure under this subsection is not limited to the employees responsible for maintaining the records.”); Marquez v. Johnson, No. Osborne v. USPS, No. 95-213, slip op. 3:10-CV-00214, 2011 WL 195617, at *4 (W.D. Harry v. USPS, Marvin T. Runyon, 60 F.3d 815 (3d Cir. 83-3238, slip op. 80-C-3568, 1983 U.S. Dist. 17, 2011) (citing Laxalt and granting plaintiff’s motion to compel production of background investigation of former agency employee, which was “relevant to the action and may be relied upon by Plaintiffs in opposing the Government’s motion” to dismiss); Buechel v. United States, No. 94-CV-5720, 1999 WL 138247, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. (2)Â Subject to this section, the Privacy Commissioner holds office during good behaviour for a term of seven years, but may be removed for cause by the Governor in Council at any time on address of the Senate and House of Commons. 11, 1983), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/guidance1983.pdf. 1988), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a VA routine use – permitting disclosure of records “in order for the VA to respond to and comply with the issuance of a federal subpoena [47 Fed. (a)Â to summon and enforce the appearance of persons before the Privacy Commissioner and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce such documents and things as the Commissioner deems requisite to the full investigation and consideration of the complaint, in the same manner and to the same extent as a superior court of record; (c)Â to receive and accept such evidence and other information, whether on oath or by affidavit or otherwise, as the Privacy Commissioner sees fit, whether or not the evidence or information is or would be admissible in a court of law; (d)Â to enter any premises occupied by any government institution on satisfying any security requirements of the institution relating to the premises; (e)Â to converse in private with any person in any premises entered pursuant to paragraph (d) and otherwise carry out therein such inquiries within the authority of the Privacy Commissioner under this Act as the Commissioner sees fit; and. 00-1511, slip op. Mar. Hounshel v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, No. An official website of the United States government. Marginal note:Notice of intention to investigate. (2)Â However, the Commissioner shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose any personal information that was created by the Commissioner or on the Commissionerâs behalf in the course of an investigation conducted by, or under the authority of, the Commissioner once the investigation and all related proceedings, if any, are finally concluded. 4, 2004) (finding it to be “clear from the documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint that she provided prior written consent . EDCV 94-0148, slip op. Apr. 2002), the D.C. District Court held that “the names, titles, salaries, and salary-levels of public employees are information generally in the public domain” and thus that they are not prohibited from disclosure under subsection (b)(2). 2d 229, 236 (D.D.C. 01-5222, 2002 U.S. App. 99-2725, slip op. Id. 1, 1985); Granton v. HHS, No. . (b)Â the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or the provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the information existed. 56Â (1)Â The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Privacy Commissioner, appoint one or more Assistant Privacy Commissioners. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. v. Watt, No. /omb/inforeg/implementation_guidelines.pdf; see also Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1268 (10th Cir. See, e.g., Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 134 (3d Cir. Reg. (b)Â any information as to whether personal information exists where the head of a government institution, in refusing to disclose the personal information under this Act, does not indicate whether it exists. See Perry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Aug. 22, 2008) (concluding that “when DOT-OIG sent the name, social security number, date of birth and gender of approximately 45,000 pilots to SSA-OIG, it was not because those records indicated a violation or potential violation of the law,” as required by language of DOT routine use), rev’d on other grounds, 596 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). La. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Air Force v. FLRA, granted enforcement of a Federal Labor Relations Authority decision requiring the Air Force to disclose to a union a disciplinary letter that was issued to a bargaining unit employee’s supervisor. Marginal note:Accuracy of personal information. 1989); NLRB v. USPS, 841 F.2d 141, 144-45 & n.3 (6th Cir. The Principles also provide individuals with certain rights to access their … LEXIS 11536, at *6 (S.D. See FOIA Update, Vol. 20Â The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct by the Government of Canada of federal-provincial affairs. Mich. Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing FBI’s disclosure of plaintiff’s arrest and indictment on white-collar crimes to financial self-regulatory body where disclosure was required by federal law), aff’d, 427 Fed App’x 497 (6th Cir. (3)Â The Governor in Council may, by order, extend the right to be given access to personal information under subsection (1) to include individuals not referred to in that subsection and may set such conditions as the Governor in Council deems appropriate. 2d 35, 45-46 (D.D.C. . The OMB Guidelines caution that “the consent provision was not intended to permit a blanket or open-ended consent clause, i.e., one which would permit the agency to disclose a record without limit,” and that, “[a]t a minimum, the consent clause should state the general purposes for, or types of recipients [to,] which disclosure may be made.” 40 Fed. at 1083-84; Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp. 2007) (noting that “the issue of whether a Privacy Act claim can be based on a defendant’s disclosure of information previously disclosed to the public is a matter of first impression both in this Circuit and in the Seventh Circuit, where the underlying action is pending,” and directing district court to stay proceedings until plaintiff “obtains from the district court . 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 19, 1984) (finding violation of Privacy Act where agency’s disclosure of records as attachments to affidavit in FOIA lawsuit “did not fall within any of the exceptions listed in Section 552a”), reconsideration granted & vacated in nonpertinent part, (D.D.C. 1989). Oct. 16, 1984); King, 471 F. Supp. 2004) (citing Bartel, and noting that defendant agency conceded that it “had no FOIA request in hand”). at 5 (D. Neb. Marginal note:Protection from civil proceeding or from prosecution. (b)Â reveal information about the individual originally obtained on a promise of confidentiality, express or implied. 375, 378 (N.D. Tex. LEXIS 21402, at *3-4 (D.D.C. 1, 3 n.6 (D.D.C. Wash. Mar. 15, 31, 35, 75, 84, c. 45, s. 24, 1996, c. 8, ss. See generally FOIA Update, Vol. Cf. The court’s “review of the Privacy Act’s purposes, legislative history, and integrated structure convince[d it] that Congress intended the term ‘disclose’ to apply in virtually all instances to an agency’s unauthorized transmission of a protected record, regardless of the recipient’s prior familiarity with it.” Id. 83-3238, slip op. La. Ohio 2013); cf. 7:11-96, 2012 WL 38608, at *2-4 (E.D. Circuit recognized the “far tighter nexus” that was required by the Third and Ninth Circuits in Britt and Swenson, and that is consistent with the legislative history, but stated: Whatever the merit of the decisions of prior courts that have held . Mo. at 737-39. was therefore correct.” The district court’s holding in Robinett was affirmed per curiam by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which specifically stated that the medical records were “released pursuant to the exception for orders of a court of competent jurisdiction contained in 5 U.S.C. Marginal note:Findings and recommendations of Privacy Commissioner, 35Â (1)Â If, on investigating a complaint under this Act in respect of personal information, the Privacy Commissioner finds that the complaint is well-founded, the Commissioner shall provide the head of the government institution that has control of the personal information with a report containing, (a)Â the findings of the investigation and any recommendations that the Commissioner considers appropriate; and. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. at 28,955, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/implementation_guidelines.pdf (proper routine use is “transfer by a law enforcement agency of protective intelligence information to the Secret Service”); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 168, 175 (S.D.N.Y. Tex. 05-4182, 2007 WL 1959193, at *6 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2007) (issuance of press release and posting of complete text of plaintiff’s reprimand on agency website was outside scope of plaintiff’s signed waiver, which was limited to “a press release announcing the conclusion of the case”); Fattahi v. ATF, 186 F. Supp. 95-3889, 1996 WL 171539, at *2 (E.D. Marginal note:Rank, powers and duties generally. LEXIS 7513, at *3-8 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1993) (same finding as in Mangino, despite fact that “court ha[d] not located” applicable routine use). “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains [subject to 12 exceptions].” 5 U.S.C. But cf. 16, 2006); Hassan v. United States, No. The D.C. 99-6157 (2d Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., United States v. Revland, No. LEXIS 2006, at *21 (D.D.C. See, e.g., Coburn v. Potter, 329 F. App’x 644, 645 (7th Cir. 7, 2013) (holding that disclosure of Plaintiff’s military performance assessment form for medical personnel by the United States Army was compatible with the use for which it was collected, “namely to manage credentials and privileges of health care providers in the Military Health System”), aff’d, 2013 WL 6222903 (D.C. Cir. In Pilon, the D.C. precludes the [agency] from complying with Plaintiff’s discovery request.”); Johnson v. United States, No. Mich. 1986) (discussing details of employee’s performance status disclosed to other personnel who were assigned to assist plaintiff), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. Prior to Doe v. DiGenova, a split of authority existed on this point. 1985); see also Reyes v. Supervisor of DEA, 834 F.2d 1093, 1095 (1st Cir. Marginal note:Investigation of exempt banks. 2:01 CV 637, 2006 WL 1094558, at *2 (N.D. Ind. (b)Â on the request of the head of the government institution concerned, be heard and determined in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National Capital Act.